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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
FRANK DAVID CLAUSON, 
Respondent, 
Appellant. 
Case No. 
8517 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Frank David Clauson, appellant here, was by jury trial 
found guilty of the crime of sodomy ; after psychiatric ex-
amination as required by Title 77, Chapter 49, Section 1, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, he was sentenced to be incar-
cerated in the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term 
of not less than three nor more than twenty years. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's brief states the facts in a light most favor-
able to appellant; respondent does not adopt the facts as 
stated by appellant. Albeit the complaining witness had 
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previously been charged with adultery (R. 35) and offered 
to submit to intercourse in a proper manner with the de-
fendant at the time of the commission of the crime charged 
(R. 35 and 41) the defendant and appellant so conducted 
himself as to place the complaining witness in fear for her 
very life. He placed a wire around her neck; (R. 16) he 
threatened her with a yellow-handled pocket knife, he placed 
the point of the blade against her ribs; (R. 18) he cut her 
with the knife; (R. 19) he threatened her life with the 
knife declaring: 
"I can take and use this on you [the knife] and 
take you over and get some dry twigs and limbs and 
put you on top of them, and put gas on them and 
nobody will ever find you. 
* * * * 
"I have done it before and they have never got 
me" (R. 21). 
This was the testimony of the complaining witness; the 
jury apparently believed sufficient of it to establish the 
commission of the crime charged. 
The defendant and appellant tells another story (R. 
99, 132). He admits being with the complaining witness 
on the day of the offense; (R. 103) they drank beer and 
wine together and visited \Vith her sister; he accounts for 
the time taken on the trip from Park City to Heber as 
having been spent sleeping in his car at Keetley; (R. 108) 
he had the complaining witness throw the wine bottle out 
of the car on the highway after leaving Keetley and on the 
way to Heber (R. 110 and 121). [The sheriff found the 
bottle at the scene of the crime (R. 88) .] He admitted 
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ownership of the knife which had been identified and placed 
in evidence (R. 129). The jury may have relied more upon 
what the sheriff said on rebuttal (R. 133, 134) than upon 
the words of your appellant; appellant had at no time prior 
to the trial claimed to be sleeping a way the time during 
which the commission of the crime occurred. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE FORMS OF VERDICT FURNISHED BY 
THE COURT WERE ADEQUATE AND SUFFI-
CIENT. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUC'TIONS. 
POINT III 
THE COURT· BELOW DID NOT ERR IN AL-
LOWING THE SHERIFF TO TESTIFY AS TO 
A CONVERSATION HAD BETWEEN THE 
SHERIFF AND THE DEFENDANT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FORMS OF VERDICT FURNISHED BY 
THE COURT WERE ADEQUATE AND SUFFI-
CIENT. 
The jury was instructed in part, as follows: 
"You are instructed that contained within the 
principal crime of Sodomy as charged in the Infor-
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mation in this case, is the lesser crime of attempt to 
commit the crime of Sodomy. In this connection 
you are instructed that a person is guilty of an at-
tempt to commit the principal crime charged in the 
Information when he has the present intent to com-
mit such crime, and performs an overt act or overt 
acts tending to the commission of the principal 
crime as charged in the Information but fails in, or 
is prevented from, accomplishing such principal 
crime charged in the Information because of being 
prevented from full accomplishment of his purpose 
to commit such principal crime by resistance on the 
part of the one upon who he would commit such an 
offense or by the interference of circumstances 
which are against the will and purpose of the de-
fendant himself." 
"You are instructed that the material allega-
tions of the Information as the same apply to the 
lesser offense of an attempt to commit the crime of 
Sodomy are as follows: 
"1. That on or about the 14th day of Septem-
ber, 1955 the defendant, Frank David Clauson, at-
tempted to insert his penis into the anus or into the 
mouth of Mavis North. 
"2. That the consummation of such attempt 
was prevented by the resistance of the said Mavis 
North or by some circumstance outside of the de-
fendant himself. 
"3. That such attempt occurred at Wasatch 
County, State of Utah. 
"You are further instructed that if you find 
that the State has proved to your satisfaction beyond 
reasonable doubt each and both of the foregoing 
material allegations numbered 1 and 2, and should 
you further find from the evidence that the material 
allegation numbered 3, has been proved by the State 
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by a preponderance of the evidence, then the defen-
dant is guilty of the crime of attempt to commit 
Sodomy as charged in the Information and it is your 
duty to so find. But if from a full, fair and impar-
tial consideration of all of such evidence you have 
a reasonable doubt as to the truth of any of such 
m·aterial allegations numbered 1 and 2, or should 
you further find that the State has failed to prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence allegation num-
bered 3, then you cannot find the defendant guilty 
of the crime of attempt to commit Sodomy as 
charged in said Information and it is your duty to 
acquit him." 
The Court also instructed the jury : 
"You are instructed that it is your duty to con-
sider all of the evidence given in this case as the 
same applies to the principal crime of Sodomy as 
charged in the Information. And if you are con-
vinced beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant 
is guilty thereof, it is your duty to so find, and to 
then disregard the instructions given herewith which 
pertain to the included offense of attempt to commit 
Sodomy as charged in the said Information. But if 
after a full, fair and impartial consideration of all 
of such evidence you have a reasonable doubt as to 
whether or not the defendant is guilty of the crime 
of Sodomy as charged in the Information, then it is 
your duty to determine from the evidence given in 
this case, as the same applies to the charge of at-
tempt to commit Sodomy as charged in the Infor-
mation, whether or not the defendant is guilty of 
the lesser offense of attempt to commit Sodomy. 
And if from such a consideration of the evidence you 
are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the de-
fendant is guilty of the crime of attempt to commit 
Sodomy, it is your duty to convict him of such crime. 
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But if you then have a reasonable doubt as to 
whether or not the defendant is guilty of the crime 
of attempt to commit Sodomy, then you must acquit 
him. 
"In other words, it is your duty to first con-
sider all of the evidence given as the same applies to 
the principal crime charged, and to consider such 
evidence as the same applies to the lesser offense 
charged, only if you are not satisfied beyond reason-
able doubt as to his guilt of the principal crime 
charged. If then you are not satisfied beyond rea-
sonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of one or 
the other of such charged offenses, then you must 
acquit him." 
After which the court furnished the jury the following 
forms of verdict : 
I 
We, the Jury impanelled In the above entitled 
cause, find the defendant guilty of the crime of Sodomy 
as charged in the information. 
II 
We, the Jury impanelled in the above entitled 
cause, find the defendant guilty of the crime of intent 
to commit Sodomy charged in the Information. 
III 
We, the Jury impanelled in the above entitled 
cause, find the defendant not guilty. 
Appellant was informed against for the crime of sod-
omy; 76-53-22, Utah Code Annotated 1953. Assault with 
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intent to commit sodomy, 76-7-7, U. C. A. 1953, is, respon-
dent thinks, an included offense. State v. Blythe, 20 Ut. 
378, 58 P. 1108; State v. Smith, 90 Ut. 482, 62 P. 2d 1110. 
The instructions above set forth clearly informed the jury 
of the included offense. Had the jury found from the evi-
dence that the offense was not consummated but that ap-
pellant committed an overt act or acts with the intent to 
commit the offense a finding of guilty of the lesser included 
offense could have been returned. 
Appellant contends that intent is an essential element 
to the offense of sodomy. This court has held that "no 
particular intent is a necessary element of the offense." 
State v. Turner, 3 Ut. 2nd, 285 P·. 2d 1045. Based upon the 
false premise that intent is. a necessary element to the of-
fense appellant further contends that "* * * the in-
tent to commit sodomy is not a crime under the statute or 
at common law;" therefor, says appellant, a form of verdict 
should have been furnished the jury upon which the jury 
"* * * might have found the defendant guilty of an 
attempt to commit sodomy." They deal with niceties and 
play with words. The evidence of the state tended to prove 
the commission of the completed crime of sodomy as 
charged in the information and it was not the duty of the 
court to instruct on lessor included offenses whether re-
quested to do so or not. State v. Mitchell, 3 Ut. 2d 70, 278 
P. 2 618. Logically, it would follow that where an instruc-
tion on an attempt to commit the crime charged was not 
requested and not the duty of the court to give, then fur-
nishing the jury with such a verdict form should not be 
required. We are familiar with the case of State v. Smith, 
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supra, wherein this court makes out a distinction between 
attempt to rape and assault with intent to rape and goes 
on to say, at page 1117: 
"* * * that where the evidence permits, the 
trial court should instruct the jury with respect to 
offenses included in the charged offense and also 
that they may find the defendant guilty of an at-
tempt to commit the offense charged." (Emphasis 
added.) 
The Idaho Supreme Court in following the holding of 
this court in State v. Smith, supra, said: 
"It is * * * only where the evidence per-
mits, that the trial court should instruct a jury with 
respect to offenses included in the charged offense 
and with respect to attempts." State v. Elsen, 187 
P. 2d 976, 979. (Emphasis added.) 
Be what has been said as it may, the court did in fact 
instruct the jury of the attempted offense of assault with 
intent to commit sodomy, and did provide the jury with a 
form of verdict upon which such a finding might have been 
returned. However, from the record itself, it appears more 
than clearly reasonable that the jury, having found defen-
dant guilty of the principal offense, did not see fit under 
the instructions to give consideration to the included and 
lesser charge. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS. 
Appellant's contention is that under the facts and the 
testimony the question of whether or not the complaining 
"' 
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witness was or was not an accomplice was a question of 
fact to be submitted to the jury under proper instruction. 
Res.pondent thinks appellant misunderstands what con-
stitutes an accomplice. By its accepted terms it can only be 
"one who knowingly, voluntarily, and with com.mon 
intent with the principal offender unites with him 
in the commission of the crime." Wharton's Crim-
inal Evidence, Vol. 2, 12th Ed. p. 229. 
Such was not your appellant's defense to the charge in the 
court below; appellant's defense was a complete denial of 
the commission of the offense. The case for the prosecu-
tion was inconsistent with any theory of law involving an 
accomplice. In fact, there was no such issue raised on either 
side and corroboration of the prosecutrix's testimony was 
not required. The rule enunciated in State v. Smith, 27 4 P. 
2 246, 2 U t. 2, 358, requiring corroboration under 77-31-18, 
U. C. A. 1953, is not here applicable. 
In this state there is no statutory definition of an ac-
complice. State v. Caroles, 7 4 Ut. 94, 277 P. 203; State v. 
Cragun, 85 Ut. 149, 38 P. 2 1071; State v. Bowman, 92 Ut. 
540, 70 P. 2 458, 461, 111 A. L. R. 1493; State v. Fertig, 
• 0 0 Ut. 0 0 0, 233 P. 2 347. The rule is in this state, however, 
that: 
"An accomplice is one who is liable to prosecu-
tion for the identical offense charged against the 
defendant on trial." State v. Fertig, supra. 
The evidence for appellant in the case at bar goes to a denial 
of the offense charged; the evidence of the prosecution sup-
ports the commission of the crime upon the victim by force 
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and through fear. It is true that in many sex crimes such 
as adultery, fornication, incest or sodomy, one who partici-
pates in the crime is an accomplice in the prosecution of 
the other involved. But the general rule has well recognized 
exceptions, such as where the crime is committed through 
force, threats, duress, fraud or undue influence. The reason 
for this is obvious-the intent necessary to constitute one 
an accomplice cannot exist with the overcoming of the will 
which is an essential ingredient of the commission of an 
offense by threat and force. See Hutson v. U. S., U. S. C. 
A. 9th Cir., Oct. 1956, 238 F. 2 167. One who consents to 
perpetration of sodomy or fellatio on herself solely because 
of physical violence or threats of great bodily harm is not 
an "accomplice" whose testimony to such offenses must 
be corroborated. People v. Bathilana, 126 P. 2 923, 52 
Cal. App. 2 685. There are a host of such cases digested, 
see American Digest System, Criminal Law 507 (7) ; 77-31-
14 U. C. A. 1953 is not for application here and the legis-
lature has not as yet seen fit to require corrobor~tion of 
the prosecutrix's testimony in all sex offenses in the absence 
of the involvement of an accomplice. As a matter of law 
the victim was not an accomplice. 
POINT III 
THE COURT BELOW DID NOT ERR IN AL-
LOWING THE SHERIFF TO TESTIFY AS TO 
A CONVE·RSATION HAD BETWEEN THE 
SIIERIFF AND THE DEFENDANT. 
The sole objection made to the complained of testimony 
of the sheriff was that the conversation constituted hearsay. 
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Over such objection the sheriff was permitted to testify as 
to what he, the sheriff, told the defendant what the com-
plaining witness had said. The sheriff had asked the de-
fendant if he had driven the complaining witness directly 
to Heber and the defendant had: replied that he had, and 
that he did not stop with the complaining witness anywhere 
between Park City and Heber. Thereafter, the sheriff testi-
fied that he said to the defendant "I believe I better tell 
you what she said". He said "What did she say?" I said 
"She claims on the way over to Heber that you drove on 
the Kamas road and took her up some place where you 
had illicit sexual relations." He said "That is not true, I 
drove her straight to Heber". I said "She makes it even 
worse than that, she said that you used a wire around her 
throat and also that you stuck her with a knife in an at-
tempt to make her give in to you." He said "That is not 
the truth," that he did not take her off the road against 
her will at any time. While defendant did deny his guilt, 
it is entirely clear that the conversation embraced an ad-
mission of the defendant that he had been in the company 
of the complaining witness on the date of the offense 
charged at or near the scene of the crime. Such evidence is 
admissible. Douglas .v. State, Cal., 120 P. 2d 921, 926, State 
v. Irwin, 101 Ut. 365, 120 P. 2d 285. 
We recognize the rule that courts will not receive the 
testimony of a witness as to what some other person told 
him, as evidence of the existence of the fact asserted. State 
Bank of Beaver County v. Hollingshead, 82 Ut. 416, 25 P. 
2d 612. The reason for this rule is that the unsworn state-
ment of a person not called as a witness or subjected to the 
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test of cross-examination is not recognized as having suffi-
cient probative effect to raise an inference that the fact is 
as stated. Steel v. Jensen, Wash. 115 P. 2d 145. However, 
the objection that evidence is Hearsay is frequently raised 
under circumstances not calling for an application of the 
Hearsay rule, and the reports are full of cases in which 
the courts have refused to sustain such an objection. Golden 
v. Keene Cement and Plastic Company, 98 Ut. 23, 95 P. 2d 
755. \Ve think that the complete answer upon which the 
rule of the court admitting the testimony of the sheriff 
should be sustained is to be found in a statement from Corn.-
monwealth v. Godfrey (Pa.), Vol. I, Section 441, pages 
434-435: 
"The hearsay rule has no application where the 
question is whether certain things were said or 
written by a third person, and not whether they are 
true." 
Wigmore on Evidence, Third Ed. Section 1361, says this: 
"The theory of the Hearsay rule is that, when 
a human utterance is offered as evidence of the truth 
of the fact asserted in it, the credit of the assertor 
becomes the basis of our inference, and therefore 
the assertion can be received only when made upon 
the stand subject to the test of cross-examination. 
If, therefore, an extrajudicial utterance is offered, 
not as an assertion to evidence in the matter as-
serted, but without reference to the truth of the 
matter asserted, the Hearsay rule does not apply. 
The utterance is then merely not obnoxious to that 
rule. It may or may not be received, according as it 
has any relevancy in the case; but if it is not re-
ceived, this is in no way due to the Hearsay rule. 
* * * * 
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"The prohibition of the Hear say rule, then, does 
not apply to all words or utterances merely as such. 
If this fundamental principal is clearly realized its 
application is a comparatively simple matter. The 
Hear say rule excludes extra judicial utterances only 
when offered for a special purpose, namely as asser-
tions to evidence the truth of the matter asserted. 
Mr. Justice Wade, in a concurring opinion, John C. Cutler 
Association v. De Jay Stohrs, 3 Ut. 2 107, 279 P. 2d 700, 
discusses the above rule as treated by the work of Wigmore. 
In the case at bar, the statement by the sheriff was in no 
wise an assertion of the truth of the fact, but was merely 
in response to a question as to what was said during a 
conversation between the defendant and himself; further, 
the testimony was in no wise prejudicial since the commis-
sion of the offense was clearly and conclusively established 
by evidence independent of the testimony of the sheriff. 
CONCLUSION 
The verdict and sentence should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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